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Summary. The harmonization of data protection legislation in Europe has been 
theoretically achieved by means of the EU directive on data protection. In practice 
the harmonization is not absolute and conflicts and inconsistencies continue to 
exist in the way Member States are implementing the directive. The integration of 
different European medical systems by means of grid technologies will continue to 
be challenging if technology does not intervene to enhance interoperability 
between national regulatory frameworks on data protection. In this paper we 
present an approach to model and automate privacy requirements for the sharing of 
patient data across within a semantic knowledge base. Then we approach the usage 
of the model for the purpose of providing automated decision support mechanism 
which would help medical professional complying with legal privacy requirements. 
Our methods starts with the capturing and the semantic modelling of privacy 
obligations that are of legal, ethical or cultural nature. These requirements are for 
the sharing of personal data between different European Member States. Our 
model reflects both similarities and conflicts, between the different Member States. 
We then use the resulting model in order to allow the reasoning on the safeguards 
a data controller should ask from an organization belonging to another Member 
State before disclosing medical data to them. This work shows that it is feasible; 
through the use of ontologies and semantic web technologies; to minimize 
unintentional breaches of privacy and data protection principles while sharing 
personal data on European healthgrid domains.  
Keywords. privacy, EU data protection directive, health-grid, Semantic Web 
technologies 
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1. Introduction 
When sharing medical data between different health organizations in Europe, it is 
important that the different parties involved in the sharing handle the data in the way 
indicated by the legislation of the Member State where the data was originally collected 
from. Privacy requirements, such as patient consent, may be subject to conflicting 
conditions between different national frameworks. Conflict also arises between 
different legal and ethical frameworks of the single Member State. Whilst most EU 
Member States are now governed by similar personal data protection rules, 
harmonization remains more apparent than real. This is due first to the fact that subject 
to the provision of suitable safeguards the European data protection directive [1] leaves 
some space for Member States to lay down exemptions to some of the obligations [1]. 
For example the obligation to notify the data subject of the processing of their data. 
Also for reasons of substantial public interest, Member States may lay down additional 
exemptions to the ban of the processing of sensitive personal data [1]. Second, as 
specified by some studies [2], the definitions used do not lead to a uniform 
understanding of the key concepts underpinning the directive. Focusing on the concept 
of ―Personal Data‖ for example, many Member States find it difficult to interpret. The 
UK found that in some cases data is not easily classified as personal or non personal. 
And this classification could be relative according to the circumstances. Overlaps in the 
interpretation of ―Personal Data‖ have also resulted in different ways of governing 
anonymised and pseudonymised data [2]. Consequently, the frameworks in some 
Member States such as the UK [3] tend to be less favourable to the processing of 
personal data for medical research compared to other frameworks. This includes the 
Italian data protection framework. The latter seems to grant more privileges to medical 
researchers in allowing consent to be given in a single, one-off statement [4]. This 
raises ethical concerns on handling secondary usage of the data [5]. 
These issues explain the diversity, complexity and dynamicity of the rules 
governing privacy protection. We believe modelling could simplify and abstract the 
complexity of rules from the real world to allow their automation and enforcement at 
the organizations‘ process level as a way of privacy compliance management. In 
previous work presented in [16] we have showed the usefulness of our privacy 
requirement knowledge-base for closing the gap between high level policies and 
operational access controls by suggesting a privacy aware access control model and 
architecture. In this work we use our knowledge-base for providing an automated 
privacy guidelines and advices to medical users which would help assisting them with 
their every day duties of medical data disclosure.  For this paper our ideas will be 
structured as follows: in section two, we analyze a selection of privacy requirements 
and issues associated with the sharing of patient sensitive data across European borders. 
In section three, we present our technical solution to the modelling and automation of 
privacy requirements. Section four presents a proof of usability of the model for 
building decision support applications to help the healthgrid‘s [6] medical users to 
share medical data while complying with privacy obligations. Finally we conclude and 
hint to related work and future tasks.  
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2. Materials and Methods 
The principal problem addressed in this work is, how to encode privacy legislation and 
related regulatory frameworks (e.g. institutional rules on ethics) in such a way that they 
are amenable (a) to provision of decision support for the non-expert user, (b) to 
automation of compliance at an operational level, and (c) to documentary support for 
compliance audit. This paper reports only on (a) decision support; [16] reports on (b) 
and a planned paper will cover audit. 
Our case study carries the additional complexity of a supra-national ―directive‖ 
which has been variously interpreted as national legislation. Indeed, our thesis is that 
this additional layer of complexity allows us to demonstrate the power of our method 
better than would be the case under a single regulatory regime. As is the case with EU 
directives in general, the European Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC has been 
―transposed‖, as the official jargon has it, into national legislation in the Member States. 
These national laws are not necessarily in complete agreement with the Directive, nor 
are they necessarily entirely compatible with each other. (Examples of this will be 
discussed below.) In any case, it is generally accepted that text law, i.e. the statutes 
themselves, are not ordinarily well understood and acted upon by non-experts, so that 
between the law and any potentially questionable action stands an interpreter of the law, 
a ―lawyer‖, who provides expert opinion or professional guidance. In our case, the need 
to interpret data protection legislation in the various Member States of the EU is of 
such importance to business that there are many immediate sources of guidance, such 
as, in the UK, the Information Commissioner‘s Office website guidelines [17]. In our 
work, we have sought to codify such guidelines, at least in cases where they are not 
controversial, rather than attempt the legal text itself. A standard reference work for 
research in this field is that published by the Privireal project [5] and we have largely 
relied on this. 
A relatively recent approach to harmonizing fields in which different languages or 
data structures are applied to a common domain is through so-called ―ontologies‖. An 
ontology is a standard method of organizing the concepts in a domain in such a way 
that it can map to the various linguistic or informatic practices that may occur in that 
domain. Inter-relationships between concepts, such as equivalence, subsumption, 
specialization and generalization, and so on, are also mapped. A commonly used 
language for ontology description is the Web Ontology Language (OWL, after the 
character in AA Milne‘s children‘s story) which forms the basis of the tool Protégé 
from Stanford University [18].  It is possible to reason with OWL concepts using the 
Semantic Web Rule Language (SWRL) and we have adopted both. Through the use of 
these technologies we have captured the legal requirements and modelled them as a 
semantic web knowledge base. This may be interpreted by a ‗reasoner‘ or rule engine 
to work out the applicable privacy requirements for a given case of medical data 
sharing 
Through the use of the Protégé application programming interface (API) and the 
Protégé OWL API we develop a semantic web application that allows a professional 
user to specify facts describing a specific case of proposed data sharing in order to get 
as output a list of privacy requirements that sender and recipient must comply with. 
Also users can choose to generate a report of privacy requirements per Member State. 
In our practical examples, we have used the rule-based system environment Jess [19] to 
demonstrate such reasoning in particular use-cases. Last but not least among our tools 
is the eXtensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML) which allows us to 
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interpret our high level policy rules into actionable permissions and obligations; this is 
important, but figures somewhat less in the work reported here than it does in 
subsequent work. 
3. A Selection of Privacy Requirements 
The governance of personal data in Europe imposes certain obligations of regulatory 
compliance. By ‗privacy requirements‘ we mean those obligations that must be 
fulfilled by all parties involved in the process of sharing or processing sensitive patient 
data, whether for healthcare or medical research, to preserve informational aspects of 
the patient‘s privacy. This entails understanding of conceptual information about rights, 
obligations and consequent actions; among these is the obligation to obtain and 
maintain patient consent; actions such as anonymization or pseudonymization and 
encryption as a surrogate for these; and rights, such as those of the data subject to 
dissent or to be notified. This ontological variety leads us naturally to an ontology-
based model. Our model must be sufficiently flexible to reflect any differences and, 
indeed, conflicts between EU Member States in the specification of and provision for 
these requirements. In the following paragraphs we analyze a selection of requirements 
specifically taking into consideration the degree of challenge faced when trying to 
comply with them. A fuller analysis of such challenges has been published in joint 
work with partners from the SHARE project in [7].  
3.1. Patient Consent 
To qualify as legitimate, the processing of medical data has to be covered by one of 
seven hypotheses listed in Article 7 of the Directive 95/46/EC (the first hypothesis 
being patient consent) [7]. Article 8-2(a) of the Directive thus provides that the data 
subject‘s explicit and valid consent constitutes the very first source of the legitimacy 
for the processing of his medical data. The standard of consent is defined in Article 2 of 
the directive as: ―the data subject's consent shall mean any freely given specific and 
informed indication of his wishes by which the data subject signifies his agreement to 
personal data relating to him being processed.‖ Consent for the processing of personal 
data must be given unambiguously. Consent for the processing of sensitive data must 
be explicit. The directive does not explain or define what a specific consent means, 
which creates opportunities for different interpretations from different member states. 
Article 6 of the directive permits the collection of personal data only for ―specified 
purposes‖. This might be an indication that it is meant by ―specific consent‖. In this 
context, specific consent is given only when the purpose of processing has been 
specified to and acknowledged by the data subject so as to allow him to accept or reject 
it. However, the required degree of specificity is still left unqualified and open to two 
different interpretive approaches. The first assumes that the data processor knows the 
different processing tasks in fine detail. The second interprets specific purposes for 
relatively broad sectors such as ―commercial purposes‖ or ―scientific purposes‖. The 
directive also adduces a principle on compatibility of purpose: once the processing of 
the data has been established as legitimate for a specific purpose, it may be further 
processed for a compatible purpose, as well as for any historical, statistical or scientific 
purpose.   
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At the national level, regulatory frameworks have addressed consent obligations 
either within data protection law or in other legislation, or both, including e.g. Common 
Law and Case Law. Member States‘ frameworks have highlighted various 
requirements for consent. These include the necessity, expressiveness, specificity and 
form of consent. Some Member States have modified this set of requirements by 
devoting separate sections within their data protection acts to particular issues; for 
example, the Italian legislation has simplified the ways consent is collected and should 
be recorded, as well as the determination of practicability of consent. [4].  
Based on detailed analysis in [5], some Member States do not distinguish between 
consent and explicit consent (e.g. Poland), while in others consent must always be 
explicit informed consent, although this does not mean it has to be written (e.g. 
Estonia). The Czech Republic distinguishes between consent to the processing of 
personal data and consent to the processing of sensitive data which must be explicit and 
written. UK Law requires explicit consent when sensitive data is to be processed; this 
requires  active communication between the relevant parties, but this may be other than 
written. The period of validity of consent also differs from one state to another. 
The SHARE Project [7] investigated different European and national legal frame-
works on consent for the processing of patient data and found that some general themes 
are repeated in most of these:  
 necessity of consent to the processing of the data; 
 explicit (or express) patient consent; 
 specificity of consent (specific or general); 
 way in which consent must be collected (verbal, written); 
 who may contact the data subject to get his consent; 
 how consent should be documented (electronic, printed) 
 legal competence of the data subject; 
 who may give consent instead of the data subject (next of kin, proxy or legal 
representative) 
 lifetime of consent validity; 
 practicability of consent (practicable, impracticable); and 
 Miscellaneous others of narrower scope. 
The vocabularies of most national frameworks, whether legal or ethical, include 
most of these topics. However, harmonization of these requirements is not complete, 
not only because some Member States have omitted certain requirements, but also 
because of the diversity of definitions and interpretations. Hence, we consider that 
consent requirements in Europe should be classified under a standard taxonomy where 
the local description or definition of each entity in the taxonomy is allowed to differ 
from one Member State to another.  
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3.2. Personal Data Anonymization 
Data protection legislation in Europe is mainly designed to govern and control the 
processing of personal data. While they mostly ban the processing of personal data, 
they do allow conditional lawful processing of such data in certain circumstances. If 
the conditions or circumstances do not allow, the only way to process personal data is 
by de-personalizing them first. We are interested in patients‘ medical data which is 
normally classified as ―sensitive‖ in data protection law. Research involving 
anonymous data does not require patient consent, provided data controller and 
processor commit to special safeguards to ensure complete anonymity. However, if 
anonymised data can still be considered indirectly nominative (e.g. through correlation 
with other data), consent is generally required and further safeguards must be adopted 
to protect the privacy and confidentiality of individuals [8]. De-personalization of data 
can take one of two forms, anonymisation, where all data that can potentially identify 
the data subject (the patient) are masked or eliminated, and pseudonymisation, where 
the identifying data are reversibly mapped onto and replaced by non-identifying codes 
appropriate to the circumstances. The degree of required anonymity varies from one 
Member State to another, not least because of differences in the definition of ―personal 
data‖ within the different legal frameworks. Further possible conflicts of interpretation 
also arise between Member States; these are discussed in [5]. 
3.3. Specific Purposes of Processing 
According to Article 6-1.b of the Directive 95/46/EC, data may be ―collected for 
specified, explicit and legitimate purposes and not further processed in a way 
incompatible with those purposes. Further processing of data for historical, statistical or 
scientific purposes shall not be considered as incompatible provided that Member 
States provide appropriate safeguards‖.  
Therefore, there is an assumption of compatibility between the original (collection) 
purpose and further scientific purposes. However, according to Article 11-1 of the 
directive, data subjects must be informed of the secondary use of their data, in 
particular, of the identity of the controller and the purpose of the processing. This duty 
to inform may be lifted only if the provision of this information is impossible or would 
involve a disproportionate effort. In these cases Member States shall provide 
appropriate safeguards (Article 11-2). 
The Directive considers the disclosure of personal data to third parties as a 
processing operation, and thus subject to usual legal provisos. Transfer of data, as a 
particular form of disclosure, will only be allowed if the data subject has given his 
explicit consent to the processing of those data or when processing is necessary for 
certain special purposes, such as protection of the vital interests of the subject or of the 
security of the state, or where the subject has manifestly already made that data public. 
In the light of the Data Protection Directive, if healthgrids are to be used for risk 
detection, disease monitoring and preventive care, legal guidelines should be 
established that clarify the circumstances in which professionals can make further use 
of personal data related to health in the interests of public health [7]. Such guidelines 
should allow for secondary uses even where such uses could not have been foreseen at 
the time of data collection. 
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4.  Modelling Privacy Requirements: OWL plus Rules  
The diversity, complexity and dynamicity of the rules governing privacy protection in 
Europe explains the need for a modelling approach that is able to abstract this 
complexity and facilitate its automation and enforcement at the process level. We shall 
use the term ―privacy requirements‖ to mean all those obligations that must be fulfilled 
by all parties involved in the process of sharing and processing sensitive patient data 
for medical purposes (by which we embrace both healthcare and medical research) to 
preserve the patient‘s privacy. This term therefore encompasses patient consent, 
anonymisation or pseudonymisation, the rights of the data subject including his right to 
dissent and to be notified. Our approach deals only with the requirements that could be 
enforced using a policy-based approach and does not include the cases where the 
intervention of ethical committees is essential. Our model should rather reflect 
similarity and possible conflicts between the EU Member States in the specification 
and the provision of these requirements. In the following paragraphs we present our 
attempt to model and to automate privacy requirements in the context of medical data 
disclosure in Europe. 
Our approach uses the Web Ontology language (OWL) [9] to represent privacy 
obligations in the context of medical data disclosure. OWL allows us to model the 
conceptual domain of ―data sharing‖ or ―data disclosure‖ and its components as 
hierarchies of classes/subclasses and of properties to represent the relationships 
between them. As shown in Figure1, privacy requirements (e.g. Consent) may be 
modelled as OWL classes and assigned to the ―dataSharing‖ resource as object 
properties. 
Moreover, OWL provides additional features to allow overlapping models of a 
concept to be merged, even when different naming conventions have been used for the 
same resource; for example, Explicit Consent may be termed Express Consent in 
another model but both concepts have the same meaning.2 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Ontology of privacy requirements for the sharing of patient data in Europe. 
                                                        
2  We evade here the linguistic issue: e.g. is ―explicit‖ in English the same as ―express‖ in French (i.e. 
an exact linguistic translation) or are they equivalent concepts? 
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In complex legal domains, we need to model relationships that cannot be expressed 
in OWL, whose logic for describing properties is not rich enough. Legal rules are 
usually expressed as if–then-like rules. For example, we want to model a rule stating 
that if the data belongs to the UK then patient consent is necessary for any processing. 
Expressing this kind of rule requires the use of a semantic web rule language to allow 
sets of rules to be built up in terms of the different concepts of the sharing process (as 
described in the ontology) and properties of those concepts. This allows us to reason 
with the relevant set of rules and ontology classes in order to infer privacy require-
ments for different possible instances of sharing from the real world. The Semantic 
Web Rule Language (SWRL) [10] satisfies our criteria for this task. The following 
example is a SWRL representation of the rule stating that patient consent is necessary 
for the sharing of a UK medical data item that is anonymized. Thus, 
 
dataSharing(?x)  hasSender(?x, ?s)  hasReceiver(?x, any) 
 locatedIn(?s, UK)  hasSatus(?d, Anonymized) 
→ hasConsentNecessity(?x, Necessary) 
 
In the next section we describe how the OWL ontology we have created and the 
semantic rules we have defined can be used to provide decision support for medical 
users to help them share patient data on a healthgrid in a privacy-aware manner. 
5. Decision Support for Clinicians to Enhance Privacy Compliance 
Our system has to reason on the privacy requirements model and knowledge base, 
described in the previous section, to generate protocols for medical users to guide them 
through the different processing tasks. For this purpose, we have developed a semantic 
web application that allows users to specify details of the different entities that 
constitute a sharing process and receive, as output, appropriate privacy management 
guidelines. This includes, for example, requirements regarding patient consent, such as 
establishing the necessity of consent and the required type of consent. The work we did 
in the previous section using the Protégé toolkit would be useful for ontology 
developers, e.g. to test and verify the usability of their models in decision making tasks, 
but it cannot be used by non-technical users such as clinicians. Our application allows 
clinicians and other medical users to enter a description of the data processing they 
would like to undertake in a standard fashion. A graphical user interface has been 
provided to allow non-technical users to enter descriptions in a standard way. Our 
application then processes the data under consideration in the order portrayed 
graphically in Figure 4. 
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Figure 2: Architecture of the privacy decision support application. 
 
With the OWL and SWRL model ready to receive concrete data (cf (1) in Figure 
2), the user enters data and these are matched (2) to individuals stored in the knowledge 
base. The application then creates an instance of a SWRL rule engine (3, 4). As with 
the Protégé toolkit, we have chosen Jess as a rule engine. Jess is usually accessed 
through the SWRL rule engine bridge. When working programmatically, we have first 
to create a SWRL rule engine bridge. In our case we need to explicitly set the rule 
engine name to Jess. This is because the bridge is specialized for each rule engine 
implementation. However, interaction with the bridge should be the same irrespective 
of the underlying rule engine implementation. An implementation for the Jess rule 
engine is supplied with the standard Protégé-OWL distribution in a Java archive (JAR) 
called swrl-jess-bridge.jar. A class in this repository called SWRLJessBridge 
contains the Jess implementation. The constructor for this class takes an instance of the 
OWLModel class, representing the OWL knowledge base with its associated SWRL 
rules, and an instance of a Jess Rete object, which represents an instantiation of the 
Jess rule engine.  The following code snippet shows the creation of a Jess bridge. It 
assumes that the user knows how to create an instance of an OWL model using the 
Protégé-OWL API.   
OWLModel owlModel = ... // Create using normal Protege-OWL mechanisms. 
SWRLRuleEngineBridge bridge = BridgeFactory.createBridge("SWRLJessBridge", owlModel);  
A SWRLRuleEngineBridgeException will be thrown if any errors occur during 
the bridge creation.  Once the Jess bridge is created, the public methods it inherits from 
the SWRLRuleEngineBridge class can be used to interact with it.  
Once an instance of a jess SWRL bridge is created we invoke the infer() method 
(a method of the class SWRLRuleEngine) in order to load the facts and rules into the 
rule engine, do all the necessary transformations before and after running the rule 
engine and record the newly inferred axioms into the ontology (5). 
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6. Case-Study and Results 
 
In this section, we explain how privacy requirements are integrated within some 
real world workflows of medical data sharing. We focus on a real world grid scenario, 
the MammoGrid project [12], whose aim was to standardize scanned mammograms for 
use in epidemiological studies, quality control for breast cancer screening, comparative 
diagnosis and validation of computer aided detection algorithms for mammographic 
images. For this case study, we focus mainly on the requirement of patient consent for 
two critical phases of the data lifecycle: (a) uploading the data from local resources to 
the grid, and (b) sharing the data on the grid. Data sharing for this project involve 
organizations from two EU Member states, UK and Italy. With a substantial grid node 
at CERN to support communication, we suppose that France is a grid party as well. 
6.1.1. Uploading Data on the Grid 
When a user requests to upload data from the hospital database to the federated 
grid database, the system must first generate the set of privacy obligations that the user 
needs to comply with before the data is uploaded to the grid. These requirements are 
generic and do not depend on the geographic location of the entities that would have 
access to it or share it in the future. In other terms, the national legal and ethical 
framework would be the primary reference for identifying privacy requirements for this 
task. Requirements could include anonymisation, pseudonymisation, data de-
identification including image scrambling, consent for storing the data in the grid and 
obligations related to the quality of the data including data provenance, accuracy and 
relevance.  To achieve this goal, a local version of the framework must be deployed as 
part of the local resources at each hospital or medical research centre participating in 
the grid. 
The data that is subject to processing for this project are patient breast 
mammograms along with other data revealing the age and somebody metrics of the 
patient. Data anonymization was not a preferred option for protecting patient identity as 
the data that should be hidden forms important clinical variables for comparative 
diagnosis. The justification to the processing of patient data was patient consent and/or 
ethical approval. For the UK, patient consent is considered necessary even when ethical 
approval was granted. However, ethical approval is a sufficient condition for Italy. 
When a technician at one of the grid nodes tries to upload some local data to the shared 
grid database, our system will automatically generate a set of privacy guidelines to 
assist her through her data uploading task. For example, the following rule will be 
inferred in order to indicate to a radiologist at a French hospital that more than an 
express and specific patient consent is required in order to share data on the grid: 
 
dataSharing(?x)   hasSender(?x, ?s)   locatedIn(?s, France) 
 concerns(?x, ?d)    belongsTo(?d, France)   
→  consentNecessity (?x, Necessary) 
 consentExplicitness(?x, Express) 
 consentSpecificity(?x, SpecificConsent) 
 
Similarly indicating to an Italian technician that patient consent is not necessary 
for uploading medical data to the grid will be based on firing up the following rule: 
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dataSharing(?x)   hasSender(?x, ?s)  locatedIn(?s, Italy) 
 concerns(?x, ?d)  belongsTo(?d, Italy)  
→  consentNecessity (?x, Necessary)  
        con_Explicitness(?x, Any) 
        consentSpecificity(?x, SpecificConsent) 
 
The following schema demonstrates the kind of output the user gets when they 
interact with the decision support prototype application, when they choose the type of 
the data to be shared as mammogram and select the consent requirements report button. 
 
Sharing Subject Compliance 
Sharing Data Type: mmx Member State: all 
 UK  
Necessity Necessary 
Specificity Specific 
Explicitness Any 
Who can contact GP only 
 
 Italy  
Necessity Unnecessary 
Specificity Broad 
Explicitness Any 
Who can contact Research team 
 
 France  
Necessity Necessary 
Specificity Specific 
Explicitness Express 
Who can contact Research team 
 
 
Figure 3 Schematic report of privacy requirements per Member State. 
 
Downloading Data from the Grid 
In our application, the grid system is not fully open and data may be shared only 
on request. When a user within Member State A requests to access data belonging to 
another Member State B, the system should generate the relevant set of requirements 
which are just the additional safeguards that Member State B would usually ask users 
in Member State A to guarantee before sharing medical data with them. Allowing 
access to the data would be subject to some security policies that are not part of our 
focus and also to the privacy assurance the user provides when requesting the access. In 
order to control data disclosure when downloading data from the grid, a distributed 
version of the framework is required. As shown in Figure 6.7, this application will be 
deployed as a component of a general privacy compliance framework we are working 
on. This allows the management of sharing requests coming from all nodes 
participating on the grid in an appropriate manner.  
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Figure 4. Architecture integrating the privacy decision support application in MammoGrid services layer. 
 
The data now is uploaded to the grid and ready to process for the specific medical 
purposes of the MammoGrid project. It is very likely that patients‘ mammograms 
would be shared with clinicians across European borders. In many cases researchers 
will require the data to be downloaded to their personal storage devices. At this stage, 
we are more concerned with the use of data for future purposes. A British organization 
might insist that when their data is to be processed by an Italian grid user, either the 
new processing purpose should be compatible with the purpose the patient has 
consented to or patient consent must be collected for the new purpose. The following 
rules determine who can contact the patient in order to collect consent, first for the UK: 
 
dataSharing(?x)  concerns(?x, ?data)  belongsto(?data, UK) 
 about(?data, ?patient)  hasPurpose(?x, ?p)  
 isa(?p, SecondaryPurpose)  generalPractitioner(?gp, ?patient) 
→ consentPointofContact(?gp) 
 
and for Italy: 
 
dataSharing(?x)  concerning(?x, ?data)  
 belongsto(?data, Italy)  about(?data, ?patient) 
 hasPurpose(?x, ?p)  isa(?p, SecondaryPurpose) 
 hasRequestor(?x,?r)  
→ ConsentPointofContact(?r) 
 
and for France: 
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    dataSharing(?x)  concerning(?x, ?data) 
 belongsto(?data, France)  about(?data, ?patient) 
 hasPurpose(?x, ?p)   isa(?p, SecondaryPurpose)  
 hasRequestor(?x,?r)  
→ ConsentPointofContact(?r) 
 
7. Related Work 
There has been some other work involving a legal decision support mechanism in 
sharing biomedical data. Notable in the literature is the work of the caBIG project [20]. 
caBIG, funded and led by the National Cancer Institute's Center for Bioinformatics, has 
as its goal the delivery of innovative approaches for the prevention and treatment of 
cancer. Its vision is the implementation of infrastructure and tools with broad utility 
and reusability within and outside the cancer community. These tools are designed to 
support the sharing and reuse of large volumes of research data created by high 
throughput genomics and proteomics technologies. The legal, regulatory and security 
requirements for data sharing were studied [21] and specialized tools are being 
developed in order to address these challenges. Among the tools being developed and 
adopted by caBIG infrastructure is the Data Sharing and Security Framework (DSSF) 
[22]. The caBIG DSSF can be used as a decision support tool to facilitate data sharing 
by determining which data can be shared and under which type of access, data security 
and regulatory controls. This requires the user to assess the sensitivity of the data by 
using the Framework's Privacy, Confidentiality and Security Considerations element 
[23]. For example, the framework asks the user to select the category of sensitivity that 
best describes the data he wants to share. The user can choose from three categories: (a) 
Low Sensitivity (i.e. de-identified or anonymised data set), (b) Medium (coded or 
limited data set), or (c) High Sensitivity (identifiable data). By doing so the framework 
can answer legal questions related to Privacy and Security, such as the sample question, 
Do federal or state laws or your institution's policies prohibit or restrict disclosure?  
This framework, if automated and adopted, would certainly have a key impact on 
enhancing the task of data sharing while complying with diverse legislation. The 
ambiguity around legal issues of privacy would be better clarified by providing 
specialized answers to users‘ concerns. However, we have noted certain concerns: first, 
leaving the responsibility to individual medical users to assess the sensitivity of data 
presents a risk of inconsistent assessments and diverse judgements for the same data, 
possibly because of lack of experience or expertise in the privacy domain. Second, the 
DSIC Knowledge Center [24] is working on automating the DSSF decision support 
tools. The work is in progress and information about methodology, architecture and 
techniques adopted has not yet been published. 
 
8. Conclusion and Future Work 
Privacy requirements for the sharing of medical data between European Member States 
can be described within a semantic model. Once it is rich enough, the model can form a 
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knowledge base for an inference engine to reason about the duties of medical users as 
imposed by different European and national legislation in order to preserve patient 
privacy. The new inferred knowledge generated by the inference engine can provide 
guidelines and protocols to help clinicians and other medical users across Europe to 
share medical data while complying with relevant regulatory frameworks. Our work 
has mainly focused on the requirement of patient consent, but we believe other 
requirements could be modelled in the same way, including anonymization, role-
roaming, etc. 
In the literature, several research projects have addressed the problem of privacy 
management for sharing identifiable data across European borders including [13] and 
[14]. However, they have tackled this problem as only a system process through 
designing a system and access controls that are privacy aware. We have similarly 
addressed these issues in [15]. In contrast, the work in this paper stresses the 
importance of considering privacy management and compliance as a human process 
through more effective teaching of privacy policies and by providing users with 
automated support to help minimizing unintentional breaches of privacy principles. 
In future work, we will extend our semantic model of privacy requirements by 
classifying privacy requirements rules under two main categories allowing the users to 
differentiate between legal and ethical guidelines. It would also be valuable to adduce a 
measure of confidence in any given decision, using, for example, different authoritative 
rankings of statutes and rules to weight alternative decisions. In addition, we are 
looking at integrating non-European policies such us the US Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA).  
 
9. References 
[1] EU Directive 95/46/EC: The Data Protection Directive. Available from: 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/docs/95-46-ce/dir1995-46_part1_en.pdf. 
[2] McCullagh, K. A study of data protection: harmonization or confusion? Proceeding of the 21st 
BILETA Conference: ―Globalisation and Harmonisation in Technology Law‖; 2006. 
[3] Iversen A. et al. Consent, confidentiality, and the Data Protection Act, British Medical Journal 
332(7534):165–9, 2006. 
[4] Decreto legislativo 30 giugno 2003, n. 196 Codice in materia di protezione dei dati personali Italian 
Personal Data Protection Code, Legislative Decree No. 196 (June 30 2003). 
[5] Beyleveld, D. et al. Implementation of the data protection directive in relation to medical research in 
Europe, Ashgate. 2004.   
[6] Breton, V. et al. The HealthGrid White Paper. Proceedings of the Third HealthGrid Conference; 2005. 
Available from: http://initiative.healthgrid.org/fileadmin/whitepaper/HealthGrid_whitepaper_full.pdf 
[7] SHARE Deliverable D4.3 [Internet]. Legal, social & economic challenges component roadmap II. 
Available from:  http://www.eu-share.org/about-share/deliverables-and-documents.html 
[8] Fond de la Recherche en Santé du Quebec [Internet]. A Governance framework For Data Banks and 
Biobanks Used for Health Research.2006 Dec. Available from: 
http://www.frsq.gouv.qc.ca/en/ethique/pdfs_ethique/Sommaire_groupe_conseil_anglais.pdf 
 [9] W3C Recommendation [Internet]. McGuinness, D.L., van Harmelen, F. OWL Web Ontology Language 
Overview2,. February 2004. Available from:  www.w3.org/TR/owl-features/.LA. 
[10] Joint US/EU ad hoc Agent Markup Language Committee [Internet]. SWRL: A Semantic Web rule 
language combining OWL and RuleML. 2004. Available from:  
www.w3.org/Submission/2004/SUBM-SWRL-20040521/. 
[11] Friedman-Hill E. Jess in Action: Java Rule-Based Systems. Manning Publications Company, 
Greenwich; 2003. 
[12] R. Warren, A.E. Solomonides, et al. MammoGrid — a prototype distributed mammographic database 
for Europe Clinical Radiology. 2007; 62 (11); 1044-1051 
 16 
[13]  PRIME [Internet]. Privacy and Identity Management for Europe. PRIME Architecture . 2007; Version 2. 
Available from:  https://www.prime-project.eu/prime_products/reports/ 
[14] PRIMELife.eu [Internet]. Privacy and Identity Management for Europe for Life. Available from:  
   http: //www.primelife.eu/ 
[15] Rahmouni, H.B.; Solomonides, T.; Mont, M.C.; Shiu, S. Privacy Compliance in European Healthgrid 
Domains: An ontology-based  approach. Proceedings of the 22nd IEEE International Symposium of 
Computer-Based Medical Systems (CBMS). Summer 2009. 
[16]  Hanene Boussi Rahmouni, Tony Solomonides, Marco Casassa Mont, and Simon Shiu. Privacy 
compliance and enforcement on European healthgrids: an approach through ontology. Phil. Trans. R. 
Soc. A September 13, 2010 368:4057-4072; doi:10.1098/rsta.2010.0169 
[17] The Guide to Data Protection. UK. Available From 
http://www.ico.gov.uk/upload/documents/library/data_protection/practical_application/the_guide_to_da
ta_protection.pdf 
[18] Protégé official website. Available at: http://protege.stanford.edu/  
[19] E. Friedman-Hill. Jess in Action: Java Rule-based Systems, Manning Publications Company, 
         June 2003, ISBN 1930110898, http://herzberg.ca.sandia.gov/jess/ 
[20] The caBIG official Website. Available from: https://cabig.nci.nih.gov/ 
[21] The caBIG Data Sharing Policy. Available from 
https://cabig.nci.nih.gov/working_groups/DSIC_SLWG/data_sharing_policy 
[22] The caBIG Documentation and Training Workspace in cooperation with the Data Sharing and 
Intellectual Capital Workspace and the caGrid Knowledge Center . An Introduction to caGrid 
Technologies and Data Sharing Prepared for the caBIG® Community. May 2010. Available at: 
https://wiki.nci.nih.gov/download/attachments/24271074/Intro_GridTech_DataSharing.pdf 
[23] caBIG Privacy Decission Support  Tool.  Available at https://cabig-
kc.nci.nih.gov/DSIC/KC/index.php/Privacy_Decision_Support 
[24] caBIG Data Sharing and Intellectual Capital (DSIC) Knowledge Center. Available from:  https://cabig-
kc.nci.nih.gov/DSIC/KC/index.php/Main_Page 
 
 
